Major Works of Eric S. Maskin
- "An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract", with P.A. Diamond 1979, Bell JE
- "The Implementation of Social Choice", with P. Dasgupta
and P. Hammond, 1979, RES
- "A Differentiable Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms" with
J.J. Laffont, 1979, in Laffont, editor, Aggregation and
Revelation of Preferences
- "A Differentiable Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms" with J.J. Laffont, 1980, Econometrica
- "The Theory of Incentives" with J.J. Laffont, 1982,
in Hildenbrand, editor, Advances in Economic Theory
- "Monopoly with Incomplete Information", with J. Riley, 1984, Rand JE
- "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers", with J. Riley, 1984, Econometrica
- "Auction Theory and Private ValueS", 1985, AER
- "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly
Inefficient Equilibria", with R. Radner and R.B.Myerson, 1986, RES
- "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games", with P. Dasgupta, 1986, RES
- "Optimal Non-Linear Pricing with Two-Dimensional Characteristics" with J.J. Laffont and J.C. Rochet, 1987, in Groves et al., editors, Information,
Incentives and Economic Mechanisms
- "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal", with J. Tirole, 1990, Econometrica
- "Renegotiation in Repeated Games", with J. Farrell, 1989, Games and Econ
Behav
- "Repeated Games with Long Run and Short Run Players", with D. Fudenberg and D. Kreps, 1990, RES
- "Nash and Perfect Eqilibria of Discounted Repeated Games", with D. Fudenberg, 1990, JET
- "Mechanism Design: How to implement social goals", 2007 [nobel]
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