[p.147]
Chapter 12
THE STATE OF LONG-TERM EXPECTATION
I
We have seen in the previous chapter that the scale
of investment depends on the relation between the rate of interest and the
schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital corresponding to different scales
of current investment, whilst the marginal efficiency of capital depends on the
relation between the supply price of a capital-asset and its prospective yield.
In this chapter we shall consider in more detail some of the factors which
determine the prospective yield of an asset.
The considerations upon which expectations of prospective yields are based
are partly existing facts which we can assume to be known more or less for
certain, and partly future events which can only be forecasted with more or less
confidence. Amongst the first may be mentioned the existing stock of various
types of capital-assets and of capital-assets in general and the strength of the
existing consumers' demand for goods which require for their efficient
production a relatively larger assistance from capital. Amongst the latter are
future changes in the type and quantity of the stock of capital-assets and in
the tastes of the consumer, the strength of effective demand from time to time
during the life of the investment under consideration, and the changes in the
wage-unit in terms of money which may occur during its life. We may sum up the
state of psychological expectation which covers the [p.148] latter as
being the state of long-term expectation;¾as
distinguished from the short-term expectation upon the basis of which a producer
estimates what he will get for a product when it is finished if he decides to
begin producing it to-day with the existing plant, which we examined in Chapter
5.
II
It would be foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to
matters which are very uncertain.[1] It
is reasonable, therefore, to be guided to a considerable degree by the facts
about which we feel somewhat confident, even though they may be less decisively
relevant to the issue than other facts about which our knowledge is vague and
scanty. For this reason the facts of the existing situation enter, in a sense
disproportionately, into the formation of our long-term expectations; our usual
practice being to take the existing situation and to project it into the future,
modified only to the extent that we have more or less definite reasons for
expecting a change.
The state of long-term expectation, upon which our decisions are based, does
not solely depend, therefore, on the most probable forecast we can make. It also
depends on the confidence with which we make this forecast¾on
how highly we rate the likelihood of our best forecast turning out quite wrong.
If we expect large changes but are very uncertain as to what precise form these
changes will take, then our confidence will be weak.
The state of confidence, as they term it, is a matter to which
practical men always pay the closest and most anxious attention. But economists
have not analysed it carefully and have been content, as a rule, to discuss [p.149]
it in general terms. In particular it has not been made clear that its
relevance to economic problems comes in through its important influence on the
schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital. There are not two separate
factors affecting the rate of investment, namely, the schedule of the marginal
efficiency of capital and the state of confidence. The state of confidence is
relevant because it is one of the major factors determining the former, which is
the same thing as the investment demand-schedule.
There is, however, not much to be said about the state of confidence a
priori. Our conclusions must mainly depend upon the actual observation of
markets and business psychology. This is the reason why the ensuing digression
is on a different level of abstraction from most of this book.
For convenience of exposition we shall assume in the following discussion of
the state of confidence that there are no changes in the rate of interest; and
we shall write, throughout the following sections, as if changes in the values
of investments were solely due to changes in the expectation of their
prospective yields and not at all to changes in the rate of interest at which
these prospective yields are capitalised. The effect of changes in the rate of
interest is, however, easily superimposed on the effect of changes in the state
of confidence.
III
The outstanding fact is the extreme precariousness of the basis of knowledge
on which our estimates of prospective yield have to be made. Our knowledge of
the factors which will govern the yield of an investment some years hence is
usually very slight and often negligible. If we speak frankly, we have to admit
that our basis of knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a
railway, a copper mine, a textile factory, the goodwill of a patent medicine, an
Atlantic [p.150] liner, a building in the City of London amounts to
little and sometimes to nothing; or even five years hence. In fact, those who
seriously attempt to make any such estimate are often so much in the minority
that their behaviour does not govern the market.
In former times, when enterprises were mainly owned by those who undertook
them or by their friends and associates, investment depended on a sufficient
supply of individuals of sanguine temperament and constructive impulses who
embarked on business as a way of life, not really relying on a precise
calculation of prospective profit. The affair was partly a lottery, though with
the ultimate result largely governed by whether the abilities and character of
the managers were above or below the average. Some would fail and some would
succeed. But even after the event no one would know whether the average results
in terms of the sums invested had exceeded, equalled or fallen short of the
prevailing rate of interest; though, if we exclude the exploitation of natural
resources and monopolies, it is probable that the actual average results of
investments, even during periods of progress and prosperity, have disappointed
the hopes which prompted them. Business men play a mixed game of skill and
chance, the average results of which to the players are not known by those who
take a hand. If human nature felt no temptation to take a chance, no
satisfaction (profit apart) in constructing a factory, a railway, a mine or a
farm, there might not be much investment merely as a result of cold calculation.
Decisions to invest in private business of the old-fashioned type were,
however, decisions largely irrevocable, not only for the community as a whole,
but also for the individual. With the separation between ownership and
management which prevails to-day and with the development of organised
investment markets, a new factor of great importance has entered in, which
sometimes facilitates investment but sometimes adds [p.151] greatly to
the instability of the system. In the absence of security markets, there is no
object in frequently attempting to revalue an investment to which we are
committed. But the Stock Exchange revalues many investments every day and the
revaluations give a frequent opportunity to the individual (though not to the
community as a whole) to revise his commitments. It is as though a farmer,
having tapped his barometer after breakfast, could decide to remove his capital
from the farming business between 10 and 11 in the morning and reconsider
whether he should return to it later in the week. But the daily revaluations of
the Stock Exchange, though they are primarily made to facilitate transfers of
old investments between one individual and another, inevitably exert a decisive
influence on the rate of current investment. For there is no sense in building
up a new enterprise at a cost greater than that at which a similar existing
enterprise can be purchased; whilst there is an inducement to spend on a new
project what may seem an extravagant sum, if it can be floated off on the Stock
Exchange at an immediate profit.[1] Thus
certain classes of investment are governed by the average expectation of those
who deal on the Stock Exchange as revealed in the price of shares, rather than
by the genuine expectations of the professional entrepreneur.[2]
How then are these highly significant daily, even hourly, revaluations of
existing investments carried out in practice? [p.152]
IV
In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to fall back on what is, in
truth, a convention. The essence of this convention¾though
it does not, of course, work out quite so simply¾lies
in assuming that the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely,
except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change. This does not
mean that we really believe that the existing state of affairs will continue
indefinitely. We know from extensive experience that this is most unlikely. The
actual results of an investment over a long term of years very seldom agree with
the initial expectation. Nor can we rationalise our behaviour by arguing that to
a man in a state of ignorance errors in either direction are equally probable,
so that there remains a mean actuarial expectation based on equi-probabilities.
For it can easily be shown that the assumption of arithmetically equal
probabilities based on a state of ignorance leads to absurdities. We are
assuming, in effect, that the existing market valuation, however arrived at, is
uniquely correct in relation to our existing knowledge of the facts which
will influence the yield of the investment, and that it will only change in
proportion to changes in this knowledge; though, philosophically speaking, it
cannot be uniquely correct, since our existing knowledge does not provide a
sufficient basis for a calculated mathematical expectation. In point of fact,
all sorts of considerations enter into the market valuation which are in no way
relevant to the prospective yield.
Nevertheless the above conventional method of calculation will be compatible
with a considerable measure of continuity and stability in our affairs, so
long as we can rely on the maintenance of the convention.
For if there exist organised investment markets and if we can rely on the
maintenance of the convention, an investor can legitimately encourage himself
with the [p.153] idea that the only risk he runs is that of a genuine
change in the news over the near future, as to the likelihood of which he
can attempt to form his own judgment, and which is unlikely to be very large.
For, assuming that the convention holds good, it is only these changes which can
affect the value of his investment, and he need not lose his sleep merely
because he has not any notion what his investment will be worth ten years hence.
Thus investment becomes reasonably 'safe' for the individual investor over short
periods, and hence over a succession of short periods however many, if he can
fairly rely on there being no breakdown in the convention and on his therefore
having an opportunity to revise his judgment and change his investment, before
there has been time for much to happen. Investments which are "fixed"
for the community are thus made 'liquid' for the individual.
It has been, I am sure, on the basis of some such procedure as this that our
leading investment markets have been developed. But it is not surprising that a
convention, in an absolute view of things so arbitrary, should have its weak
points. It is its precariousness which creates no small part of our contemporary
problem of securing sufficient investment.
V
Some of the factors which accentuate this precariousness may be briefly
mentioned.
(1) As a result of the gradual increase in the proportion of the
equity in the community's aggregate capital investment which is owned by persons
who do not manage and have no special knowledge of the circumstances, either
actual or prospective, of the business in question, the element of real
knowledge in the valuation of investments by whose who own them or contemplate
purchasing them has seriously declined.
(2) Day-to-day fluctuations in the profits of existing [p.154] investments,
which are obviously of an ephemeral and non-significant character, tend to have
an altogether excessive, and even an absurd, influence on the market. It is
said, for example, that the shares of American companies which manufacture ice
tend to sell at a higher price in summer when their profits are seasonally high
than in winter when no one wants ice. The recurrence of a bank-holiday may raise
the market valuation of the British railway system by several million pounds.
(3) A conventional valuation which is established as the outcome
of the mass psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals is liable to
change violently as the result of a sudden fluctuation of opinion due to factors
which do not really make much difference to the prospective yield; since there
will be no strong roots of conviction to hold it steady. In abnormal times in
particular, when the hypothesis of an indefinite continuance of the existing
state of affairs is less plausible than usual even though there are no express
grounds to anticipate a definite change, the market will be subject to waves of
optimistic and pessimistic sentiment, which are unreasoning and yet in a sense
legitimate where no solid basis exists for a reasonable calculation.
(4) But there is one feature in particular which deserves our
attention. It might have been supposed that competition between expert
professionals, possessing judgment and knowledge beyond that of the average
private investor, would correct the vagaries of the ignorant individual left to
himself. It happens, however, that the energies and skill of the professional
investor and speculator are mainly occupied otherwise. For most of these persons
are, in fact, largely concerned, not with making superior long-term forecasts of
the probable yield of an investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing
changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general
public. They are concerned, not with what an investment is [p.155] really
worth to a man who buys it 'for keeps', but with what the market will value it
at, under the influence of mass psychology, three months or a year hence.
Moreover, this behaviour is not the outcome of a wrong-headed propensity. It is
an inevitable result of an investment market organised along the lines
described. For it is not sensible to pay 25 for an investment of which you
believe the prospective yield to justify a value of 30, if you also believe that
the market will value it at 20 three months hence.
Thus the professional investor is forced to concern himself with the
anticipation of impending changes, in the news or in the atmosphere, of the kind
by which experience shows that the mass psychology of the market is most
influenced. This is the inevitable result of investment markets organised with a
view to so-called 'liquidity'. Of the maxims of orthodox finance none, surely,
is more anti-social than the fetish of liquidity, the doctrine that it is a
positive virtue on the part of investment institutions to concentrate their
resources upon the holding of 'liquid' securities. It forgets that there is no
such thing as liquidity of investment for the community as a whole. The social
object of skilled investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and
ignorance which envelop our future. The actual, private object of the most
skilled investment to-day is 'to beat the gun', as the Americans so well express
it, to outwit the crowd, and to pass the bad, or depreciating, half-crown to the
other fellow.
This battle of wits to anticipate the basis of conventional valuation a few
months hence, rather than the prospective yield of an investment over a long
term of years, does not even require gulls amongst the public to feed the maws
of the professional;¾it can be played by
professionals amongst themselves. Nor is it necessary that anyone should keep
his simple faith in the conventional basis of valuation having any genuine
long-term validity. For it is, so to speak, a game of Snap,[p.156] of Old
Maid, of Musical Chairs¾a pastime in which he is
victor who says Snap neither too soon nor too late, who passed the Old
Maid to his neighbour before the game is over, who secures a chair for himself
when the music stops. These games can be played with zest and enjoyment, though
all the players know that it is the Old Maid which is circulating, or that when
the music stops some of the players will find themselves unseated.
Or, to change the metaphor slightly, professional investment may be likened
to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the
six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the
competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of
the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to pick, not those faces
which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch
the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem from
the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of
one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion
genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote
our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average
opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and
higher degrees.
If the reader interjects that there must surely be large profits to be gained
from the other players in the long run by a skilled individual who, unperturbed
by the prevailing pastime, continues to purchase investments on the best genuine
long-term expectations he can frame, he must be answered, first of all, that
there are, indeed, such serious-minded individuals and that it makes a vast
difference to an investment market whether or not they predominate in their
influence over the game-players. But we must also add that there are [p.157] several
factors which jeopardise the predominance of such individuals in modern
investment markets. Investment based on genuine long-term expectation is so
difficult to-day as to be scarcely practicable. He who attempts it must surely
lead much more laborious days and run greater risks than he who tries to guess
better than the crowd how the crowd will behave; and, given equal intelligence,
he may make more disastrous mistakes. There is no clear evidence from experience
that the investment policy which is socially advantageous coincides with that
which is most profitable. It needs more intelligence to defeat the forces of
time and our ignorance of the future than to beat the gun. Moreover, life is not
long enough;¾human nature desires quick results,
there is a peculiar zest in making money quickly, and remoter gains are
discounted by the average man at a very high rate. The game of professional
investment is intolerably boring and over-exacting to anyone who is entirely
exempt from the gambling instinct; whilst he who has it must pay to this
propensity the appropriate toll. Furthermore, an investor who proposes to ignore
near-term market fluctuations needs greater resources for safety and must not
operate on so large a scale, if at all, with borrowed money¾a
further reason for the higher return from the pastime to a given stock of
intelligence and resources. Finally it is the long-term investor, he who most
promotes the public interest, who will in practice come in for most criticism,
wherever investment funds are managed by committees or boards or banks.[1]
For it is in the essence of his behaviour that he should be eccentric,
unconventional and rash in the eyes of average opinion. If he is successful,
that will only confirm the general belief in his rashness; and if [p.158] in
the short run he is unsuccessful, which is very likely, he will not receive much
mercy. Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail
conventionally than to succeed unconventionally.
(5) So far we have had chiefly in mind the state of confidence of the
speculator or speculative investor himself and may have seemed to be tacitly
assuming that, if he himself is satisfied with the prospects, he has unlimited
command over money at the market rate of interest. This is, of course, not the
case. Thus we must also take account of the other facet of the state of
confidence, namely, the confidence of the lending institutions towards those who
seek to borrow from them, sometimes described as the state of credit. A collapse
in the price of equities, which has had disastrous reactions on the marginal
efficiency of capital, may have been due to the weakening either of speculative
confidence or of the state of credit. But whereas the weakening of either is
enough to cause a collapse, recovery requires the revival of both. For
whilst the weakening of credit is sufficient to bring about a collapse, its
strengthening, though a necessary condition of recovery, is not a sufficient
condition.
VI
These considerations should not lie beyond the purview of the economist. But
they must be relegated to their right perspective. If I may be allowed to
appropriate the term speculation for the activity of forecasting the
psychology of the market, and the term enterprise for the activity of
forecasting the prospective yield of assets over their whole life, it is by no
means always the case that speculation predominates over enterprise. As the
organisation of investment markets improves, the risk of the predominance of
speculation does, however, increase. In one of the greatest investment markets
in the world, namely, New York, the [p.159] influence of speculation (in
the above sense) is enormous. Even outside the field of finance, Americans are
apt to be unduly interested in discovering what average opinion believes average
opinion to be; and this national weakness finds its nemesis in the stock market.
It is rare, one is told, for an American to invest, as many Englishmen still do,
'for income'; and he will not readily purchase an investment except in the hope
of capital appreciation. This is only another way of saying that, when he
purchases an investment, the American is attaching his hopes, not so much to its
prospective yield, as to a favourable change in the conventional basis of
valuation, i.e. that he is, in the above sense, a speculator. Speculators
may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is
serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When
the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a
casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. The measure of success attained by
Wall Street, regarded as an institution of which the proper social purpose is to
direct new investment into the most profitable channels in terms of future
yield, cannot be claimed as one of the outstanding triumphs of laissez-faire capitalism¾which
is not surprising, if I am right in thinking that the best brains of Wall Street
have been in fact directed towards a different object.
These tendencies are a scarcely avoidable outcome of our having successfully
organised 'liquid' investment markets. It is usually agreed that casinos should,
in the public interest, be inaccessible and expensive. And perhaps the same is
true of stock exchanges. That the sins of the London Stock Exchange are less
than those of Wall Street may be due, not so much to differences in national
character, as to the fact that to the average Englishman Throgmorton Street is,
compared with Wall Street to the average American, inaccessible and very
expensive. The jobber's 'turn', the high [p.160] brokerage charges and
the heavy transfer tax payable to the Exchequer, which attend dealings on the
London Stock Exchange, sufficiently diminish the liquidity of the market
(although the practice of fortnightly accounts operates the other way) to rule
out a large proportion of the transactions characteristic of Wall Street.[1] The
introduction of a substantial Government transfer tax on all transactions might
prove the most serviceable reform available, with a view to mitigating the
predominance of speculation over enterprise in the United States.
The spectacle of modern investment markets has sometimes moved me towards the
conclusion that to make the purchase of an investment permanent and
indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or other grave cause,
might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils. For this would force the
investor to direct his mind to the long-term prospects and to those only. But a
little consideration of this expedient brings us up against a dilemma, and shows
us how the liquidity of investment markets often facilitates, though it
sometimes impedes, the course of new investment. For the fact that each
individual investor flatters himself that his commitment is 'liquid' (though
this cannot be true for all investors collectively) calms his nerves and makes
him much more willing to run a risk. If individual purchases of investments were
rendered illiquid, this might seriously impede new investment, so long as alternative
ways in which to hold his savings are available to the individual. This is
the dilemma. So long as it is open to the individual to employ his wealth in
hoarding or lending money, the alternative of purchasing actual capital
assets cannot be rendered sufficiently attractive (especially to the man who
does [p.161] not manage the capital assets and knows very little about
them), except by organising markets wherein these assets can be easily realised
for money.
The only radical cure for the crises of confidence which afflict the economic
life of the modern world would be to allow the individual no choice between
consuming his income and ordering the production of the specific capital-asset
which, even though it be on precarious evidence, impresses him as the most
promising investment available to him. It might be that, at times when he was
more than usually assailed by doubts concerning the future, he would turn in his
perplexity towards more consumption and less new investment. But that would
avoid the disastrous, cumulative and far-reaching repercussions of its being
open to him, when thus assailed by doubts, to spend his income neither on the
one nor on the other.
Those who have emphasised the social dangers of the hoarding of money have,
of course, had something similar to the above in mind. But they have overlooked
the possibility that the phenomenon can occur without any change, or at least
any commensurate change, in the hoarding of money.
VII
Even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability
due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our
positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical
expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our
decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn
out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits¾of
a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a
weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative
probabilities. Enterprise [p.162] only pretends to itself to be mainly
actuated by the statements in its own prospectus, however candid and sincere.
Only a little more than an expedition to the South Pole, is it based on an exact
calculation of benefits to come. Thus if the animal spirits are dimmed and the
spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us to depend on nothing but a mathematical
expectation, enterprise will fade and die;¾though
fears of loss may have a basis no more reasonable than hopes of profit had
before.
It is safe to say that enterprise which depends on hopes stretching into the
future benefits the community as a whole. But individual initiative will only be
adequate when reasonable calculation is supplemented and supported by animal
spirits, so that the thought of ultimate loss which often overtakes pioneers, as
experience undoubtedly tells us and them, is put aside as a healthy man puts
aside the expectation of death.
This means, unfortunately, not only that slumps and depressions are
exaggerated in degree, but that economic prosperity is excessively dependent on
a political and social atmosphere which is congenial to the average business
man. If the fear of a Labour Government or a New Deal depresses enterprise, this
need not be the result either of a reasonable calculation or of a plot with
political intent;¾it is the mere consequence of
upsetting the delicate balance of spontaneous optimism. In estimating the
prospects of investment, we must have regard, therefore, to the nerves and
hysteria and even the digestions and reactions to the weather of those upon
whose spontaneous activity it largely depends.
We should not conclude from this that everything depends on waves of
irrational psychology. On the contrary, the state of long-term expectation is
often steady, and, even when it is not, the other factors exert their
compensating effects. We are merely reminding ourselves that human decisions
affecting the future, whether personal or political or economic, cannot [p.163]
depend on strict mathematical expectation, since the basis for making such
calculations does not exist; and that it is our innate urge to activity which
makes the wheels go round, our rational selves choosing between the alternatives
as best we are able, calculating where we can, but often falling back for our
motive on whim or sentiment or chance.
VIII
There are, moreover, certain important factors which somewhat mitigate in
practice the effects of our ignorance of the future. Owing to the operation of
compound interest combined with the likelihood of obsolescence with the passage
of time, there are many individual investments of which the prospective yield is
legitimately dominated by the returns of the comparatively near future. In the
case of the most important class of very long-term investments, namely
buildings, the risk can be frequently transferred from the investor to the
occupier, or at least shared between them, by means of long-term contracts, the
risk being outweighed in the mind of the occupier by the advantages of
continuity and security of tenure. In the case of another important class of
long-term investments, namely public utilities, a substantial proportion of the
prospective yield is practically guaranteed by monopoly privileges coupled with
the right to charge such rates as will provide a certain stipulated margin.
Finally there is a growing class of investments entered upon by, or at the risk
of; public authorities, which are frankly influenced in making the investment by
a general presumption of there being prospective social advantages from the
investment, whatever its commercial yield may prove to be within a wide range,
and without seeking to be satisfied that the mathematical expectation of the
yield is at least equal to the current rate of interest,¾though
the rate which the public [p.164] authority has to pay may still play a
decisive part in determining the scale of investment operations which it can
afford.
Thus after giving full weight to the importance of the influence of
short-period changes in the state of long-term expectation as distinct from
changes in the rate of interest, we are still entitled to return to the latter
as exercising, at any rate, in normal circumstances, a great, though not a
decisive, influence on the rate of investment. Only experience, however, can
show how far management of the rate of interest is capable of continuously
stimulating the appropriate volume of investment.
For my own part I am now somewhat sceptical of the success of a merely
monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of interest. I expect to
see the State, which is in a position to calculate the marginal efficiency of
capital-goods on long views and on the basis of the general social advantage,
taking an ever greater responsibility for directly organising investment; since
it seems likely that the fluctuations in the market estimation of the marginal
efficiency of different types of capital, calculated on the principles I have
described above, will be too great to be offset by any practicable changes in
the rate of interest.
Footnotes: [p.148] 1 - By
"very uncertain" I do not mean the same thing as "very
improbable". Cf. my Treatise on Probability, chap. 6,
on "The Weight of Arguments". [back to text]
[p.151] 1 - In my Treatise on
Money (vol. ii, p.195) I pointed out that when a company's shares are quoted
very high so that it can raise more capital by issuing more shares on favourable
terms, this has the same effect as if it could borrow at a low rate of
interest. I should now describe this by saying that a high quotation for
existing equities involves an increase in the marginal efficiency of the
corresponding type of capital and therefore has the same effect (since
investment depends on a comparison between the marginal efficiency of capital
and the rate of interest) as a fall in the rate of interest. [back to text]
[p.151] 2 - This does not apply, of
course, to classes of enterprise which are not readily marketable or to which no
negotiable instrument closely corresponds. The categories falling within
this exception were formerly extensive. But measured as a proportion of
the total value of new investment they are rapidly declining in importance. [back to text]
[p.157] 1 - The practice, usually
considered prudent, by which an investment trust or an insurance office
frequently calculates not only the income from its investment portfolio but also
its capital valuation in the market, may also tend to direct too much attention
to short-term fluctuations in the latter. [back to text]
[p.160] 1 - It is said that, when
Wall Street is active, at least a half of the purchases or sales of investments
are entered upon with an intention on the part of the speculator to reverse them
the same day. This is often true of the commodity exchanges also. [back to text]
|